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Abstract — The paper presents initial step toward new network 
anomaly detection method that is based on traffic visualisation. 
The key design principle of the proposed approach is the lack 
of direct, linear time dependencies for the created network 
traffic visualisations. The method’s feasibility is demonstrated 
in network steganography environment by presenting steg-
tomography methodology and developing the dedicated 
visualisation tool. To authors’ best knowledge this is the first 
utilization of network traffic visualisations for steganalysis 
purposes. 
Keywords: steganalysis, steganography detection, traffic 
visualisation  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Anomalies in network traffic can be caused by malicious 
actions that might compromise network security. Thus, 
anomaly detection methods in telecommunication networks 
focus on finding illegal activities/events, especially those that 
can be caused by potential attacker/intruder. The device that 
offers such functionality is called Intrusion 
Detection/Prevention System (ID/PS) that is a vital network 
security component allowing the implementation of the 
assumed security policy. However, currently such solutions 
for the telecommunication networks are facing problems 
caused mostly by huge traffic volume that must be 
monitored: they are not efficient enough. And in ideal 
situation traffic analysis should be performed in a near real-
time manner to prevent potential attacks as soon as possible. 
This urges to work on effective and efficient solutions for 
network anomaly detection. 
Anomalies are defined as patterns that do not conform to 
defined and expected established principle. The essence of 
the anomaly detection is a problem of finding data patters 
that do not fit the defined set of the expected behaviour. 
Anomaly detection methods have wide spectrum of 
applications ([1], [2]) from detection of credit card frauds, 
software/hardware malfunctions, military applications to 
detection of the malicious activities in telecommunication 
networks. 
Anomaly detection in telecommunication networks 
focuses on finding illegal activities/events, especially those 
that can be caused by potential attacker/intruder. Illegal 
activity includes: DoS (Denial of Service) or DDoS 
(Distributed DoS) attacks, network devices port scanning 
attempts or hacking of the security measures, hostile devices 
takeovers or other events that can be harmful for security 
policy defined for a given network. Other sources of 
anomalies include worms, viruses or trojans. However, 
another new threat is currently seen as a rising threat to 
network security: network steganography ([3], [4]). Such 
methods may be easily utilised as a tool for data exfiltration 
or to enable network attacks. Detection of network 
steganography is still in its infancy and does not have 
satisfactory methods/devices. 
The main aim of network steganography is to hide secret 
data “inside” the carrier i.e. normal transmissions of users. In 
an ideal situation hidden data exchange cannot be detected 
by third parties unaware of the steganography usage. The 
best carrier for secret messages must have two features. 
Firstly, it should be popular i.e. usage of such carrier should 
not be considered as an anomaly itself. The more instances 
of such carriers (steganographically unmodified) are present 
and utilized in network the better, because they mask using 
particular carrier to perform hidden communication. 
Secondly, modification of the carrier related to inserting the 
steganogram should not be “visible” to the third party not 
aware of the steganographic procedure. Contrary to typical 
steganographic methods which utilize digital media 
(pictures, audio and video files) as a cover for hidden data 
(steganogram), network steganography utilizes 
communication protocols’ control elements and their basic 
intrinsic functionality. As a result, such methods are harder 
to detect and eliminate. 
In the last decade one can observe very intensive research 
effort related to steganography and its detection methods and 
to network steganography in particular. This has been caused 
by two facts: first, industry and business interest in DRM 
(Digital Rights Management) and second alleged utilisation 
of the steganographic methods by terrorist while planning 
attack on USA on September 11th, 2001 [6]. Incoming years 
proved that it was not an isolated case: in 2010 it was 
reported that the uncovered Russian spy ring used digital 
picture steganography to leak classified information from 
USA to Moscow [7].  
In order to minimize the potential threat to public 
security, identification of such methods is important as is the 
development of effective detection (steganalysis) methods. 
As mentioned above, up till now no universal, widely 
deployed detection methods exist that are efficiently able to 
fight network steganography usage. Therefore, it is important 
to include in the detection methods development the ability 
to uncover steganographic communication as well.  
That is why, in this paper we make an initial step towards 
more general steganalysis method based on network traffic 
visualisation that we named steg-tomography. The approach 
is demonstrated on example of LACK (Lost Audio Packets 
Steganography) steganographic method that is one of the 
state of the art steganographic method for VoIP (Voice over 
IP) and was introduced in 2008 [26]. This solution takes 
advantage of the fact that in typical multimedia 
communication protocols, excessively delayed packets are 
not used for the reconstruction of transmitted data at the 
receiver; that is, the packets are considered useless and 
discarded. Thus, for some of the chosen voice packets 
intentional delay is introduced and their payload is 
substituted with secret data. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes background and related work in anomaly detection, 
steganalysis and network traffic visualisation for security 
purposes. Section 3 describes experimental methodology: 
details of the proposed steganalysis approach, chosen 
steganographic method and developed testbed. Section 4 
presents and discusses obtained experimental results. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes our efforts. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Anomaly detection can be classified, based on 
availability of the training data that is used to "teach" 
detection methods of what the anomalies are (both for 
normal as well as anomaly class), as [1]: 
• Supervised Anomaly Detection (examples: [12], [13]) – 
where there is availability of a training data set (both 
normal and anomalous). Based on this data proper 
models are derived. Next, unseen, inspected data is 
classified based on comparison with these models. 
• Semi-supervised Anomaly Detection (examples: [14], 
[15]) – where the training data has instances for only the 
normal class (which is more desirable). That is why these 
methods are more widely applicable than supervised 
techniques. 
• Unsupervised Anomaly Detection – where training data 
is not required (which is most desirable), thus such 
methods are most widely applicable. These methods 
make the implicit assumption that normal behaviour is far 
more frequent than anomalies and utilises this rule to 
detect such defined anomalies. 
 
As mentioned in Section 1, in telecommunication 
networks the devices that are responsible for anomaly 
detection are called ID/PSs. ID/PSs usually utilise detection 
methods from semi-supervised or unsupervised groups. 
Denning in [16] divided these systems into: host-based 
intrusion detection systems (HIDS – an example of such 
IDS/IPS is described in [17]) are dedicated to protect single 
user host and network-based intrusion detection systems 
(NIDS – an example of such solution is described in [18]) 
are used for the whole network protection. Moreover, in 
ideal situation traffic analysis and anomaly detection should 
be performed in a near real-time manner to prevent potential 
attacks as soon as possible. However, current ID/PS systems 
are, generally, unable to achieve this goal, because they are 
facing the following problems related to: 
• Huge traffic volume that should be monitored – many 
IDS/IPS systems are just not efficient enough to process 
it in near real-time manner. 
• The difference between normal/expected and 
anomalous behaviour that can be sometimes hard to 
define. For example, network steganography methods 
intentionally imitate users’ network traffic behaviour in 
order to hide their existence, thus it can be qualified as a 
normal behaviour. On the other hand real user’s traffic 
can be classified as anomaly in certain circumstances 
(e.g. implementation of the new protocol or service that 
was not encountered before by ID/PS). 
• Potential adaptability of the attacker behaviour in 
order to omit disclosure. 
• Nature of the telecommunication networks and their 
services – normal/expected behaviour can change in 
time. Thus, expected behaviour in a given time moment 
does not guarantee successful anomaly detection in the 
future. 
• Existence of the certain behaviours that are caused by 
users without negative intentions. Such behaviours 
(e.g. caused by device malfunction) cannot be treated as 
expected/normal behaviour but can make detection of the 
real network anomalies harder. 
 
Moreover, it must be emphasised, that although ID/PSs 
are usually including detection of various kinds of anomalies 
– mainly network attacks, they are not able in their current 
form to prevent network steganography utilisation.  
Network steganography detection methods were 
somewhat developed independently from ID/PS systems. 
Most steganalysis methods focus on trying to detect the 
presence of hidden communication and then on limiting its 
transmission capabilities, because as stated in [5] and [19] 
elimination of all network steganography opportunities is 
practically impossible. Currently, most steganalysis methods 
can be characterised by high computational complexity and 
are time consuming, which in practise limits their 
applicability for real-network traffic. Steganography 
detection methods can be divided into [20]: 
• Statistical steganalysis – examples of such solutions 
include methods based on linear regression SVM 
(Support Vector Machines) or information theory. 
Statistical steganalysis methods can rely on some simple 
rules which are created based on the probability of 
occurrence of certain events e.g. filling with data some 
rarely used or optional fields from protocol headers. The 
example of such method for IPv4 protocol was proposed 
by Murdoch et al. [21]. Sohn et al. [22] developed 
solution for detection of steganographic methods that 
utilise IP Identification (IPv4) and ISN (TCP) fields and 
is based on SVMs. 
• CI (Computational Intelligence) based steganalysis – 
such methods utilise: neural networks, fuzzy logics or 
genetic algorithms. An example of such methods was 
proposed by Tumoian et al. [23]. Steganalysis of DSSS 
method that uses genetic algorithm was developed by 
Sedghi et al. [24]. 
• Hybrid solutions that incorporates functionality of both 
of above groups. An example of hybrid steganalysis was 
introduced by Knapik et al. [25] and it combines 
utilisation of SVMs and genetic algorithm. 
 
In this paper an initial step towards new anomaly 
detection method based on network traffic visualisation is 
presented. To prove the method’s feasibility it will be 
applied in network steganography environment.  
Currently, visualization systems are widely used for 
network security and together they are described by term 
security visualization. Generally, network security benefits 
from visualization of traffic by facilitating hosts/servers 
monitoring, analysis of external-internal communications, 
port activity or routing behaviour. It is also suitable to 
discover attack patterns (a good survey by Shiravi et al. is 
available [27]). However, to authors’ best knowledge this is 
the first approach that utilises network traffic visualisation 
for steganalysis purposes. The method’s details and its 
utilization for network steganography will be explained in 
the following sections. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY  
A. Detection Methodology 
To authors’ best knowledge this is the first approach that 
utilises network traffic visualisation for steganalysis 
purposes. The key design principle of the proposed anomaly 
detection approach is the lack of direct, linear time 
dependencies for the created network traffic visualisations. 
The detection method functions by observing snapshots 
(traffic visualisations) of captured network traffic (three 
chosen parameters) in the defined time frame (window). The 
time window size depends on many factors like the type of 
inspected steganographic method, the type of traffic affected, 
the available resources etc. Of course, the size of the 
observation window can be extended to e.g. single 
connection (as it presented in this paper) or the visualisations 
can be periodically updated while the connection lasts 
(Fig.1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Detection methodology possibilities 
The approach utilized in this paper for steganalysis 
purposes that we named steg-tomography can be divided into 
the following steps: 
1. Analyse the steganographic method functioning and 
choose the list of potential parameters for the 
observation. 
2. Perform initial visualisations on steganographic and 
non-steganographic data to analyse and limit the 
parameters to the three most promising ones. 
3. Analyse and choose the best size of the observation 
window i.e. the period for which network traffic 
visualisation(s) will be created. 
4. For traffic that needs evaluation preform 
visualisations according to the selected observation 
window and after analysis decide whether it carries 
secret data or not. 
 
B. Chosen Steganographic Method and Experimental 
Setup 
LACK is a steganographic method intended for a broad class 
of multimedia real-time applications like IP telephony or 
videoconferencing.  It was originally proposed in 2008 [26] 
and is considered as one of the states of the art VoIP 
steganographic techniques [28]. 
LACK benefits from the fact that in typical real-time 
multimedia environments excessively delayed packets are 
not used for the reconstruction of transmitted data at the 
receiver, i.e. the packets are considered useless and 
discarded. It impacts the interior of the packets that carry 
user’s voice (RTP packets) as well as their time 
dependencies.  
The overview of LACK functioning is demonstrated in 
Fig. 2. At the transmitter (Alice), one voice packet is selected 
from the voice stream and its payload is substituted with bits 
of the secret message (1). Then, the selected RTP packet is 
intentionally delayed prior to its transmission (2).  Whenever 
an excessively delayed packet reaches a receiver unaware of 
the steganographic procedure, it is discarded, because it 
interprets the hidden data as “invisible”. However, if the 
receiver (Bob) is aware of the hidden communication, then, 
instead of dropping the delayed RTP packet, it extracts the 
hidden data from payload (3).  
The detection of LACK is difficult for the following 
reasons: 
• Delayed RTP packets can be treated as a natural 
phenomenon for IP telephony, thus introducing 
intentionally delayed voice packets cannot be considered 
as anomalous behavior per se. 
• The size of receiving (jitter) buffer is not known in 
advance for third parties because it can be of a various 
fixed value or can be adapted dynamically e.g. to 
network conditions. Thus, from the steganalysis point of 
view it is hard to assess whether delayed RTP packets 
will be really utilized for voice reconstruction at the 
receiving end or will be treated as useless and discarded. 
 
 Figure 2. The idea of LACK 
 
Considering above it is important to develop effective 
LACK detection method. 
In this paper we will try to detect and evaluate LACK 
implementation called StegoSIP [29] that was developed as a 
part of thesis project under supervision of Prof. Luigi 
Ciminiera of Politecnico di Torino and is available under 
GNU GPLv3 licence. The application allows to control two 
of most the important LACK parameters i.e. the delay of the 
chosen voice packets and the frequency of steganographic 
packets. 
Based on the LACK operation analysis (Step 1 in Sec. 
IIIA) the following six parameters for inspected RTP stream 
were selected for further visualisation analysis: 
• Payload  
• Sequence number 
• The size of the packet 
• Payload Type 
• SSRC/CSRC identifiers 
• Jitter 
 
The experimental testbed for LACK detection is based on 
two virtual machines running on VMware Server. Both 
machines are running Linux Debian 6.0 Squeeze x86 and are 
installed with free VoIP softphone Ekiga [30] and is 
configured with defaults: Theora for video and Speex for 
speech coding. StegoSIP is applied to the Ekiga’s traffic. 
Hosts establish VoIP connections in controlled LAN (Local 
Area Network) environment and the resulting traffic is 
captured using Wireshark sniffer [31] and further processed 
with the help of developed, specialized 3D visualisation tool. 
 
C. Dedicated 3D Visualisation Tool 
Captured network traffic visualisation was performed with 
the use of the dedicated visualisation tool named Easy 3D 
Plotter. It was developed in IDE Matlab 7.11 (R2010b) 
environment. For effective plotting plot3k method [32] was 
modified and utilized. The GUI of the tool is presented in 
Fig. 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. The GUI of the developed visualisation tool 
 
The tool allows to create up to ten 3D diagrams that can 
be customised independently. The buttons in axis files… 
section allows to link each of the figure’s dimension to the 
file with captured data. The rest of the buttons influence the 
form of the resulting diagram and due to limited space will 
be not provided here. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Initial LACK analysis and results 
For the experiments StegoSIP implementation was 
configured with advised defaults i.e. the delay of the chosen 
voice packets was set to 0.5 s and the frequency of 
steganographic packets to 5 i.e. 1 for every 5 packets is 
utilized for steganographic purposes. 
The initial visualisation analysis for exemplary VoIP 
connection with LACK applied is presented in Fig. 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Exemplary steganographic VoIP call analysis using 
visualisation tool 
 
The analysis was performed considering the order of the 
RTP packets that enter receiving network interface, their 
sequence numbers and Payload Type field. It can be seen 
that single Ekiga connection consists of four distinct RTP 
streams with payload type of 121 (Theora) and 114 (Speex). 
In shown diagram it looks like there is no sign of LACK-
related anomalies. However, if we zoom in a fragment (red 
square in Fig. 4) of one of RTP streams one can see the 
discontinuities (Fig. 5). Of course lost or reordered RTP 
packets can be treated as a natural phenomenon that happens 
often in IP networks. However, as experimental results 
presented in [8] indicated packets’ reordering is rather rare. 
Moreover, packets in all RTP streams should be affected 
which is not the case here, thus, this can be treated as 
anomalous behaviour. 
 
Figure 5. Discontinuities in RTP stream 
 
This effect is also visible when we consider subsequent 
voice packets sequence numbers’ difference (see Fig. 6). In 
fact, the change in the RTP stream packets’ sequence causes 
two anomalies. First, we see the delayed packets that are 
marked red. Second, the gap caused by these packets is also 
visible in the place where they originally were  (black points 
in the blue ellipse). 
 
 
Figure 6. Subsequent voice packets sequence numbers’ 
difference (logarithmic scale) for a fragment of sequence 
numbers 
 
Results presented above prove only that there is an 
anomaly (delayed RTP packets of payload type equal to 121) 
but we cannot unambiguously state that the hidden 
communication is taking place.  
Now let us consider the size of the RTP packets (Fig. 7) 
together with their sequence numbers and the order they 
enter receiving network interface. As can be seen the delayed 
packets (marked with red) were of a size larger than 100B. 
Next, let us analyse the RTP packets’ payload. In Fig. 8 
X and Y axes present 4 bytes of payload (oldest and random) 
and Z axis describes whether the packet had subsequent 
sequence number (0) or not (1).  
Careful analysis of Fig. 8 shows that some payload bytes 
can be observed repeatedly (see white and yellow points 
marked in green ellipse that repeated from 2 to about 10 
times). However, it must be noted that single and fixed 
payload value was observed more than 50 times (marked in 
red) and it was different for delayed and not delayed RTP 
packets. Thus, it can be concluded that in the delayed voice 
packet the steganogram is carried and it is not ciphered. It 
turns out that StegoSIP implements the whole TCP/IP stack 
inside the steganographic tunnel created with use of LACK. 
That is why, only packets of a large size are chosen. 
However, this in turn makes LACK more susceptible for 
steganalysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. RTP packets size analysis 
 
 
Figure 8. Anomalies caused by StegoSIP 
Parts of the protocols’ headers that are carried inside the 
steganographic tunnel are of a fixed size and values that can 
be easily detected. Moreover, they introduce the significant 
overhead on LACK steganographic bandwidth.  
 
B. StegoSIP detection 
Let us now compare non-steganographic and steganographic 
VoIP connection. Based on the results provided in previous 
subsection in order to detect this LACK implementation it is 
advised to observe: 
• Sequence numbers or jitter of the RTP packets to 
be able to verify whether the inspected packet was 
delayed and/or is out of order. 
• Fragments of payload of RTP packets – analysis 
can be helpful to check if any other type of payload 
besides voice or video is carried. 
• RTP packets’ size – relationship between delay of 
the packets and their size can be inspected. 
 
Considering above, the comparison of steganographic and 
non-steganographic VoIP connection is presented in Fig. 9. 
The following three parameters are observed: difference in 
sequence numbers of the consecutive RTP packets, frame 
length and first 4 bytes of payload. The results presented in 
Fig. 9 are limited to only single RTP stream. Inside the 
covert channel SSHv2 (Secure Shell v2) session is tunnelled. 
In result, the most of the steganographic payload is ciphered 
using AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). For presented 
experiments below G.711 codec was utilized for voice 
connections. The StegoSIP configuration is default and the 
same as in the previous subsection. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of steganographic and non-
steganographic VoIP connection 
Fig. 9 shows that all packets were of the fixed size (217 
bytes) which is a result of the utilized voice codec. RTP 
packets for typical, non-steganographic VoIP call are 
aligned. For VoIP steganographic connection a lot of RTP 
packets were out of sequence and additionally they 
experienced the same 4 bytes of the payload (yellow square).  
This proves that the LACK steganographic method was 
applied to VoIP call and thus it can be easily detected. 
In the next step we want to observe if StegoSIP will be 
still visible if the frequency of steganographic packets is 
decreased from 5 to 20 i.e. now 1 for every 20 packets is 
utilized for steganographic purposes.  
For non-steganographic VoIP call (Fig. 10) the same 
parts of payload repeated more than 7000 times and for 
steganographic one only 4000 times (Fig. 11). Moreover, in 
the latter figure we can observe a lot of out-of-sequence 
voice packets for the same payload value. This proves that 
even decrease in steganographic bandwidth still makes 
StegoSIP detectable. 
 
 
Figure 10. Non-steganograhic VoIP call 
 
Figure 11. VoIP call with LACK applied 
C. Discussion 
StegoSIP implementation of LACK can be fairly easy 
detectable especially after taking into consideration results 
from Section IVA. This is possible for the following 
reasons: 
• StegoSIP does not cipher the secret data that is 
inserted into excessively delayed RTP packets. 
• StegoSIP tunnels the whole TCP/IP stack inside the 
covert channel and thus it makes some payload 
bytes repeatable (network protocols’ fields). 
• StegoSIP impacts RTP stream by introducing 
discontinuities in sequence numbers that as it was 
previously researched by Mazurczyk et al. [8] is 
rather rare for VoIP. The better solution is to delay 
the whole stream to invoke receiver’s buffer 
overflow or underflow. 
• StegoSIP delays packets by a fixed and always the 
same configurable value, which makes steganalysis 
easier. 
• StegoSIP tunnels secret data only in the large-sized 
packets. 
 
For these reasons detection of StegoSIP is possible even 
if the LACK steganographic bandwidth is decreased. 
However, if the abovementioned issues are taken into 
account and the implementation is upgraded then similar 
analysis should be carried out to once again assess its 
detectability. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper the first utilization of network traffic 
visualisations for steganalysis purposes was carried out. The 
key design principle of the proposed approach is the lack of 
direct, linear time dependencies for the created network 
traffic visualisations. This analysis can be treated as an initial 
step towards new anomaly detection method. Of course this 
paper had not revealed all of the benefits that network traffic 
visualisation provides for steganalysis. There is still a lot of 
future work that should be considered: 
• Different sizes of the observation window in which 
the snapshots of network traffic are performed can 
be researched. This can provide opportunity of 
faster detection. 
• Propose an algorithm that will automatically 
analyse consecutive visualisations for evaluated 
traffic/connection e.g. based on clustering. 
• The effectiveness of the proposed detection method 
must be compared with some of the most popular 
steganalysis ones. 
 
Of course, if the experiments are repeated in the real IP 
network e.g. in the Internet such analysis can be harder to 
perform. It must be emphasised that StegoSIP 
implementation issues i.e. periodic choice of steganographic 
packets and fixed delays would be visible also in real-life 
networks.  However, if these implementation issues will be 
resolved then additional experiments should be performed to 
verify its detectability. This is considered as a future work. 
Moreover, for other steganographic methods that are not 
trivial to detect network traffic visualisation analysis should 
be developed. This will give opportunity to find some 
common parameters that should be inspected in order to 
create more universal detection method that will be 
successful in disclosing network steganography. 
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